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Abstract 
 
This paper analyses the way in which the London Ambulance Service recovered from the 
events of October 1992, when it implemented a computer-aided despatch system (LASCAD) 
that remained in service for less than two weeks. It examines the enactment of a programme 
of long-term organizational change, focusing on the implementation of an alternative 
computer system in 1996. The analysis in this paper is informed by actor-network theory, 
both by an early statement of this approach developed by Callon in the sociology of 
translation, and also by concepts and ideas from Latour‟s more recent restatement of his own 
position. The paper examines how alternative interests emerged and were stabilized over 
time, in a way of arguing and acting among key players in the change programme, christened 
the Golden Circle. The story traces four years in the history of the London Ambulance 
Service, from the aftermath of October 1992 through the birth of the Golden Circle to the 
achievement of National Health Service (NHS) trust status. LASCAD was the beginning of 
the story, this is the middle, an end lies in the future, when the remaining elements of the 
change programme are enacted beyond the Golden Circle. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The United Kingdom London Ambulance Service (LAS) is one of the largest ambulance 
services in the world. It provides an accident and emergency service for London‟s 14 district 
health authorities, covers a geographical area of over 600 square miles and services a resident 
population of nearly 7 million. In October 1992 the LAS attempted to introduce a computer-
aided despatch system, LASCAD, to handle the command and control functions of the service 
automatically. The story of the events leading to the collapse of LASCAD has been told many 
times and in many ways, but what has received much less attention from academics and media 
alike is what has happened at the LAS since then. Between 1992 and 1996, the LAS was the 
subject of two major public inquiries following the failure of its computer system and the death 
of Nasima Begum. It attended a House of Commons Select Committee inquiry that investigated 
the performance of the service, and experienced various formal and informal evaluations by 
health authorities, Government ministers, and the media. The outcomes of these evaluations have 
been that the LAS was awarded National Health Service (NHS) trust status in 1996 and received 
a British Computer Society award for its control room and computer system in 1997 (London 
Ambulance Service web site, 2002; Times, 1997). 
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This paper is an account of one part of the recovery of the LAS from the events of 1992, through 
a process of long-term, and ongoing, organizational change. It focuses on the implementation of 
an alternative computer system, Call Taking (CTAK), in 1996. A key aspect of this period of 
organizational change at the LAS, and an aspect that is analysed in some detail in this paper, is 
the concept of the Golden Circle. This concept describes a method of association among actors in 
the change programme that, to varying degrees during the analysis, emerges as exclusive and 
inclusive, mysterious and rational, fabricated and real. Nevertheless, at each stage it is clear that 
the Golden Circle helped to create a space for movement at the LAS, in which a specific 
information technology (IT) implementation took place in 1996. This research does not seek to 
explain LASCAD as exceptional failure nor CTAK as exceptional success, since such 
dichotomous reasoning is thought to present too narrow a view. Rather, the argument is that 
organizational change mixes up success and failure, and other such dichotomies, in a very messy 
way, so that how we think and write about it should respect these entanglements instead of trying 
to unravel them. This work aims to do that by drawing on actor-network theory, whilst 
recognizing that its major proponents have been ambivalent over the years about how they 
understand such intertwining. 
 
Following this introductory section, this paper proceeds as follows. First, I explain the 
research approach adopted in this work, followed by a narrative description of the case 
material. Then, I present an analysis of organizational change at the LAS using an established 
vocabulary of actor-network theory – the sociology of translation (Callon, 1986; Latour, 1987). I 
reexamine that account, drawing on ideas from Latour‟s (1999a, 1999b) recent work, in 
which he rejects distinctions such as power and knowledge, even in the dialectical 
relationship that informs earlier statements of actor-network theory. Finally, I draw 
conclusions from this study. 
 
RESEARCH APPROACH 
 
Accounts of LASCAD (for example, Page et al, 1993; Financial Times, 1993; Beynon-Davies, 
1995; Hougham, 1996; Wastell and Newman, 1996; Introna, 1997) present it, to varying 
degrees, as a project in which the interests of staff were poorly addressed by management. 
Explanations of managerial and staff action necessarily differ according to the model of human 
behaviour adopted by researchers. These accounts also refer to broader social structures 
prevailing at the time, although again they vary in the extent to which they examine how these 
social structures influenced action locally. These two elements – the nature of human agency 
and the way social structures influence action – are key to explaining not only why LASCAD 
collapsed, but also why CTAK was adopted. Hence they are a central concern of this research. 
Nevertheless, there are few recent debates in the social sciences that have attracted both the 
attention and the acrimony that have surrounded the agency-structure debate, whether argued in 
terms of subject-object, local-global, social-technical, power-knowledge, human-nonhuman or 
any other of a number of possible distinctions. This research explores the view that which 
distinctions we accept, and how we understand the relationship between the two elements – 
dichotomy, dialectic or entanglement – can affect significantly the insights we gain from our 
work. 
 
Actor-network theory: the key debates 
 
Actor-network theory (Callon, 1986, 1991; Latour, 1987, 1996, 1999b) has found itself at the 
centre of these controversies, despite Latour‟s claims to have overcome them (Latour, 1991), to 
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have bypassed them (Latour, 1999b), and never to have wanted involvement in them at all 
(Latour, 1999a). In the first case, he argues that „[s]ociety and technology are not two 
ontologically distinct entities but more like phases of the same essential action‟ (Latour, 1991, 
p. 129). This position suggests an attempt at resolving or overcoming the agency-structure 
debate, despite more recent claims (Latour, 1999a) that the original idea was to ignore or bypass 
it. Latour (1999b) argues that bypass rather than resolution is appropriate, since expressions like 
power/knowledge (Foucault, 1980a) and, by implication, structuration (Giddens, 1979, 1984), 
are modernist settlements, which attempt to replace a dichotomy with a dialectic in the interests 
of the major players, but with no concern for the audience. 
 
As a collection of powerful tools and ideas, in which the social and technical worlds are 
considered to be so entangled as to define one another, actor-network theory adopts an 
analytical position of symmetry between humans and non-humans – a position that is at the 
heart of Latour‟s claims. This position has been the subject of controversy, with critics finding 
it intellectually and morally problematic to make no distinction between human action and the 
behaviour of things (Collins and Yearley, 1992). In other variants of this argument, actor-
network analyses are criticized for adopting a localized focus (Knights and Murray, 1994; 
Harbers, 1995; Reed, 1997) and an amoral stance (Winner, 1993; Knights and Murray, 1994). 
In this way, the approach is seen to subscribe to a flat ontology, neglecting the enduring nature 
of institutions as a condition for network formation as well as a consequence of it. By ignoring 
institutional sources of power and inequality, critics argue that actor-network theory has little 
to say about the systematic exclusion that prevents some social groups from having a voice in 
technology innovation. In such challenges, arguments based on dichotomies are at the heart of 
the criticism. 
 
Proponents of actor-network theory have responded to these criticisms in debates that have 
been quite vitriolic. On the symmetry issue, actor-network scholars have argued that they 
accept the divisions and distinctions, but only when they are „understood as effects or 
outcomes‟ (Law, 1999, p. 3, emphasis in the original), and that they refuse to consider the 
distinctions a priori (Callon and Latour, 1992). In the local-global debate, as in the related 
exchange on society-technology, actor-network scholars have been ambivalent about their 
position. At one time, they seemed to accept such distinctions, and argued that actor-network 
theory resolves or overcomes them (Callon, 1991; Latour, 1991; Law and Callon, 1992), only to 
argue later that such distinctions are irrelevant (Latour, 1999b). Finally, Law (1991) has argued 
that, although actor-network theory did not set out to have a moral agenda, it could adopt one, if 
researchers choose „to think not only about heroes but also of victims and the differences 
between their fates‟ (p. 15). Nevertheless, some repair work (ibid.), including the introduction of 
new concepts within actor-network theory (Latour, 1999b) and the use of complementary 
concepts from other schools of thought, has been necessary to make this move (Walsham, 1997; 
Knights et al, 1997; Hull, 1999). 
 
Some observers have commented on these debates, with a view to clarifying key arguments for 
the audience (for example, Walsham, 1997). Nevertheless, actor-network theory „is not a stable 
body of knowledge that can be drawn on by researchers in an unproblematic way, since its 
developers themselves have frequently revised or extended elements of it‟ (Walsham, 2001, p. 
46). Such critical reflection is very healthy, but in rejecting the dichotomies and dialectics 
with which we have become familiar, Latour‟s (1999b) nonmodern way of arguing requires 
some conceptual reorientation on the part of researchers. Challenged by his claims that 
discourses informed by concepts of power (Callicles), reason (Socrates), or a Foucauldian 
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settlement between the two, are elitist, with no concern for a broader community, I felt a need 
to put these arguments to the test. This paper is the outcome, but rather than examining a 
Platonic dialogue, it draws on recent case material, with a contribution to practice as well as 
research in mind. 
 
Theoretical basis of the study 
 
My research approach has been informed as follows. First, I present an account of 
organizational change at the LAS that draws on the sociology of translation (Callon, 1986), 
an established collection of concepts within actor-network theory, which „owe more than a 
little to the writing of Foucault‟ (Law, 1986, p. 18). In this version of actor-network theory, 
power exercised in discourse is a key concern. Then I reexamine my account, drawing on ideas 
from Latour‟s (1999a, 1999b) recent work, in which he aims to eschew distinctions such as 
power and knowledge, politics and morality, claiming that these are modernist arguments based 
on an irrelevant subject-object dichotomy. In the discussion that takes place, I find little 
support for Latour‟s charges of elitism and amorality in a Foucauldian informed analysis. 
Nevertheless, as I developed the argument I translated some concepts and ideas, and ended 
up at a place in which some interesting implications for research and practice emerged. 
 
The concepts and ideas that inform this research are outlined as they are adopted. However, 
since the sociology of translation (Callon, 1986) informs a significant part of the analysis, 
some further description is provided here. The sociology of translation addresses how key 
players interact to build heterogeneous networks of human and non-human actors, forming 
alliances and mobilizing resources, as they strive to convert an idea into reality. The outcome 
of these interactions is a particular accomplishment, arrived at through four moments of 
translation. These four moments involve interaction to define a problem, to which the idea is 
a proposed solution (problematization), to arouse interest in the problem (interessement), to 
consolidate alliances around a negotiated solution (enrolment), and then to mobilize allies, or 
their representatives, for implementation (mobilization). Translation is achieved by 
displacements that require discourse and the exercise of power. If successful, it directs actors 
towards the view that the proposed solution is the only way to solve the problem. If 
unsuccessful, it diverts actors away from such an obligatory passage point. 
 
Research method 
 
This research project started in April 1998 following a presentation by the IT director of the 
LAS to the Project Management Specialist Group of the British Computer Society (BCS). 
Initially, I undertook a short study, comprising five unstructured interviews with the IT director 
and two managers of operations, and an afternoon of observation in the LAS control room. This 
work addressed the technological changes that had taken place at the LAS following the 
collapse of the LASCAD system. In February 2000, I began a further, longitudinal study to 
follow through on information systems developments and associated organizational changes 
that were taking place at the LAS at that time, and to relate these developments to past projects 
– including the LASCAD and CTAK projects – and to future opportunities. So further 
fieldwork relating to the events described in this paper took place over a 12-month period 
between February 2000 and February 2001. Overall, the fieldwork comprised the following 
primary elements: 
 
 43 unstructured and semi-structured interviews of 1 to 2.5 hours duration 
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 9 periods of observation in the LAS control room (c. 50 hours) 
 Observation of 31 project meetings (over 40 hours) and 6 staff training sessions (c. 25 
hours) 
 3 periods observing ambulance crews as they attend emergency calls (c. 25 hours). 
 
In general, I used an interviewing approach with staff who support front line operations, but 
who do not usually work either in the control room or at emergency scenes, for example, board 
directors and senior managers, members of the staff training unit, IT specialists, and quality 
assurance advisors. I spoke with front line staff as they did their work, and as circumstances 
permitted these conversations. Interviews were recorded and transcribed later, whereas notes 
were taken during meetings and periods of observation. On most visits to LAS headquarters in 
London, I spent some time in an office occupied by three managers whose work supports 
control room operations, where I participated in conversations and ad hoc meetings that arose 
as these managers went about their work. 
 
I drew upon various internal documentation sources, including meeting minutes, procedure 
manuals, project plans, corporate and technology strategies, project evaluation reports and 
staff surveys. Copies of service plans, annual reports, various internal communication videos, 
newspaper articles and television programmes about the LAS were available from its Press 
and Public Affairs office. The LAS has “official” and “unofficial” web sites. The latter 
contains several pages on humour, an important feature of LAS life and a way of dealing with 
the requirements of the job. I also drew upon the public inquiry reports into the collapse of 
the LASCAD system and the death of Nasima Begum (Page et al, 1993; Wells, 1995), and 
the reports of the House of Commons Select Committee on Health (1995, 1996) into the 
performance of the LAS. 
 
Although some of these data relate to periods of organizational change at the LAS that are 
not addressed in detail in this paper, my conclusions from analysing them have contributed to 
the account presented here. That account adopts a „broadly interpretive‟ stance (Walsham, 
1993), reflecting my efforts during data analysis to identify multiple actors‟ interpretations of 
a specific four-year period of information systems implementation and related organizational 
change at the LAS. The account is reconstructed from public inquiry reports and peoples‟ 
memories, and further informed by my observations of the CTAK system in operation during 
my fieldwork efforts. The analysis focuses on the discourses of participants in the change 
programme, examining the statements that were articulated, those that were accepted, and the 
practices in which such acceptance took place. Overall, my aim was to form a view of what 
constituted the basis of truth for this community (Foucault, 1980b) during the period in 
question. 
 
THE CASE STUDY NARRATIVE 
 
This section presents the case study narrative. It traces the main events and initiatives that 
took place from the collapse of LASCAD (October 1992) through to a review by the House 
of Commons Select Committee on Health (December 1996) into the early performance of the 
LAS as a NHS trust. The base narrative is derived from the second report of the House of 
Commons Select Committee on Health (1995), and is supplemented with material from the 
research project described above. This description of technological, organizational and 
environmental developments constitutes the narrative to be analysed (Pettigrew, 1987, 1990) 
in the next section. Whilst recognizing that these developments were interrelated, limitations 
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on the length of this paper permit a focus on technological changes only, so broader 
developments are referenced selectively, where they are considered key to understanding the 
technological changes examined. 
 
The aftermath of LASCAD 
 
Following the withdrawal of the LASCAD system, a public inquiry into the events leading to 
its collapse was ordered by South West Thames regional health authority. The Page inquiry 
report, published in February 1993, argued for a programme of investment in the LAS and a 
slower pace of change. Acknowledging the need for service improvements, it recommended 
the development of a computer-aided despatch (CAD) system that should have „total 
ownership by management and staff, both within CAC [Central Ambulance Control] and the 
ambulance crews‟ (Page et al, 1993, pg. 8). A CAD system is a computerized system to handle 
the command and control functions of an emergency service automatically. Such a system would 
address most or all of the following functions to varying degrees of automation: i) call taking and 
gazetteer; ii) tracking of vehicles; iii) allocation and mobilization of resources to incidents; iv) 
ambulance resource management; and v) provision of management information. 
 
In the months following publication of the Page report, the LAS board was abolished, the 
regional health authority assumed direct responsibility for the LAS and a new top 
management team was recruited (Wells, 1995). The revised management arrangements 
became fully effective in April 1994. Initially, the new senior management team focused on 
improvements to the organizational and technical infrastructures of the LAS (LAS, 1993, 
1994a, 1994b). The regional health authority made an additional £14.8 million funding 
available to enable this strategy, conditional on improved performance against ORCON 
(Operational Research Consultancy) standards. Particular targets of responding to 80% of 
emergency calls within 14 minutes by September 1994, rising to 85% by March 1995, were 
written into the corporate plan (LAS, 1994a). ORCON standards are nationally recognized 
standards of performance for UK ambulance services, which, prior to a Government sponsored 
review (Chapman, 1996), required that: 
 
i) 50% of ambulances should reach patients within 8 minutes, and 
ii) 95% of ambulances should reach patients either within 14 minutes, in urban areas, or 
within 19 minutes, in rural areas. 
 
While the LAS was being taken back under the direct control of South Thames regional 
health authority, other ambulance services were applying for independence. These services 
were responding to a reorganization of the UK National Health Service (NHS) into a system 
of self-governing trusts, in which ambulance services, hospitals and community units 
negotiate their contractual responsibilities with regional health authorities in 
purchaser/provider relationships within an internal market. By April 1994, the majority of 
ambulance services had achieved NHS trust status. A crucial measure of the suitability of 
applicants for trust status is quality of service. In the case of an ambulance service, 
performance against ORCON standards, facilitated as appropriate by a CAD system, is a key 
concern (LAS, 1998a). 
 
The death of Nasima Begum 
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In June 1994 the media spotlight fell again upon the LAS. Against a backdrop of the declared 
intention of a House of Commons Select Committee to conduct an autumn inquiry into the 
performance of the LAS, Nasima Begum, an eleven year old schoolgirl, died of 
complications from an existing kidney condition, after a 53-minute wait for an ambulance. In 
October 1994, the Secretary of State announced a public inquiry into this event, headed by 
William Wells, chairman of South Thames regional health authority. This inquiry was to run 
alongside the Select Committee inquiry into the future of the LAS. The results of the Wells 
inquiry were published first in January 1995. Whilst acknowledging an unusually high 
demand on 19 June 1994, Wells found „continuing management weakness … inappropriate 
staff distribution and shift changeover times and virtually a complete lack of modern 
technology‟ (report foreword). A number of recommendations were made to address these 
weaknesses and additional funding was agreed to enable them. The review team expressed its 
commitment to taking the LAS „to a financial position where it can secure a significant 
improvement in performance standards and become a viable applicant for NHS trust status‟ 
(Wells, 1995, pg. 27). 
 
Following publication of the Wells report, work on its recommendations began at the LAS. In 
the control room, manual operations continued during 1995, but some restructuring took 
place to relieve issues with ambulance allocation (LAS, 1995). Further work was done on 
creating a sound IT infrastructure, including building a new ambulance control room (LAS, 
1998a). Work began in April 1995 on development of a call taking system. This development 
addressed the first of the five elements of a full CAD system referred to earlier. In effect, the 
aim was to replace the existing manual system of recording call details on slips of paper, and 
using human runners to transport the slips from the call takers to the ambulance allocators, 
with online data entry, and related enquiry and printing facilities. An online gazetteer was 
included, to replace the manual method of using a map book to determine a grid reference for 
the ambulance allocator. 
 
Criticism of the LAS re-emerged in June 1995 with publication of the findings of the House 
of Commons Select Committee on Health (1995). Whilst endorsing Wells‟ recommendation 
that the LAS seek trust status, the Committee was concerned that „it may not be practicable to 
achieve this by April 1996‟ (pg. lxvi). It claimed that the „recent history of the LAS has 
provided an object lesson in how not to manage a public service‟ (pg. xxi). Findings of 
specific interest to the technological change emphasis in this paper include the Select 
Committee‟s comments on information systems developments at the LAS. On the issue of 
procuring a new computer system, the Select Committee urged the LAS to „consider very 
seriously the possibility of purchasing an "off the shelf" CAD system‟ (pg. l). Whilst critical 
of the proposed five-year timeframe to introduce a new computer system, they gave their 
support to „the efforts that are now being made to improve the technical infrastructure of the 
LAS‟ (pg. xlviii). 
 
The award of NHS trust status 
 
Work on the bespoke development of a call taking system continued during 1995. The 
technological change enacted in this period took place in a discrete and self-supporting area 
that was analysed and dealt with in isolation from other influences. This approach, christened 
the Golden Circle, is discussed in the next section. Although external bodies were not 
allowed to interfere with the nature or manner of delivery of the change, contact was 
maintained with the regional health authority via weekly progress meetings with the 
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chairman of the region (LAS, 1998a). The new system was due for implementation by 
September 1995 (Wells, 1995), to coincide with the LAS application for NHS trust status. In 
the event, system implementation took place during January and February 1996 (LAS, 
1998a). At the same time, the decision to award trust status to the LAS was announced. Thus 
the LAS became an NHS trust on 1 April 1996 and has continued to operate in that way 
since. 
 
Following implementation of the call taking system, performance against ORCON standards 
rose progressively. By the last quarter of 1996, performance against the 8-minute standard 
had risen to 36% from an average of 16% during 1995, while performance against the 14-
minute standard had risen to 91% from an average of 74% during 1995 (House of Commons 
Select Committee on Health, 1996). The LAS entered its new control room and call taking 
system into the 1997 British Computer Society awards and gained the Information Systems 
Management excellence award on 14 May (Times, 1997). The introduction of a call taking 
system in 1996 was part of a continuing programme of organizational change at the LAS. 
Significant challenges remain, which are discussed in a postscript immediately preceding the 
conclusions from this study. These challenges include incorporating the outstanding elements 
of a full CAD system, outlined earlier. 
 
ANALYSING THE NARRATIVE 
 
This section analyses the preceding narrative using the sociology of translation. Problematization 
examines how the regional health authority, acting for the NHS and ultimately the UK 
Government, defined an obligatory passage point (OPP) in NHS trust status for the LAS. A key 
actor in this initiative was the chairman of the regional health authority, who was able to draw on 
several sources of power to translate actors towards this OPP. This action involved building a 
network of interests around his proposed solution (interessement), in a negotiated process of 
consolidating alliances with other actors (enrolment). By focusing in this paper on the 
technological developments required for the LAS to achieve NHS trust status, the IT director 
emerges as a key actor in the local context. The actions he took during interessement, enrolment 
and mobilization of support for these developments are also discussed. Thus this analysis 
examines how conflicting interests emerged and were stabilized over time through the use of 
discourse and power within and outside the LAS. Power relationships in this context should be 
understood as describing the way in which actors are „defined, associated and simultaneously 
obliged to remain faithful to their alliances‟ (Callon, 1986, pg. 224). Key to this process is a 
system of association in which actors are linked together through identities defined for them, 
which they may accept or decline. 
 
Creating the obligatory passage point 
 
When the LASCAD system collapsed in October 1992, the vision of total automation in call 
taking, vehicle tracking, resource allocation and mobilization for London's ambulance service 
was destroyed. The overarching viewpoint that the LAS needed to improve its performance 
remained intact, but the LASCAD system was no longer accepted as the mechanism (or OPP) 
for achieving that objective. Instead, deep divisions surfaced, both within and outside the 
LAS, on the appropriate mechanism. 
 
An attempt at problematization 
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Publication of the Page report (February 1993) marked a new attempt at problematization. It 
identified roles and responsibilities for key actors. The senior management team should make 
a major investment „in the workforce … the fleet and the estate‟ (pg. 64). The IT director 
would „have overall responsibility for all IT and communications planning and 
implementation‟ (pg. 63), including delivery of a new CAD system. The CAD system was 
defined as „a complex multi-supplier, systems integration project‟ (pg. 63), which might take 
„four years to develop and implement fully‟ (pg. 7). Staff should be consulted by 
management and see other evidence of management‟s „commitment to, and appreciation of‟ 
them (pg. 9). In this way, the authors of the report may be seen to propose a system of 
alliances between human and non-human actors as the way to solving the problems of the 
LAS. This method of association proposed roles and responsibilities for key actors, in which 
their identities were defined in such a way as to be mutually reinforcing (Callon, 1986). This 
problematization was not only hypothetical but also incomplete. Some actors were not in post 
to accept the proposed identities; others who were in place might not accept them. Whilst a 
new CAD system was an actor in this context, it was not defined as an OPP. Instead, South 
Thames regional health authority, which commissioned the Page inquiry and became 
responsible for the LAS following the collapse of LASCAD, attempted to create an OPP in 
the many and diverse recommendations of the Page report. In this way, it sought to link its 
interests with the identities of key actors at the LAS. This analysis focuses on how that 
attempt was negotiated and translated over time, to create a stable network of interests with a 
new OPP. 
 
The responses of the management team 
 
The appointment by the regional health authority of the members of the new senior 
management team marked an initial stage in attributing the identities proposed in the Page 
report. This attribution of identities was only partly successful. The new managers slowed the 
pace of change, compared with the period 1990-1992. They accepted their identities in as 
much as they adopted a corporate plan and technology strategy that addressed organizational 
and technical infrastructures, but in the period to January 1995, service improvements on 
which funding for these plans was agreed, were not achieved. In particular, the IT director 
negotiated his identity as the procurer of a new CAD system, by focusing on improvements 
to technical infrastructure, which included rewiring the ambulance control room and 
replacing the emergency telephone system. 
 
The responses of staff 
 
Following the withdrawal of LASCAD, tensions existed among LAS staff about the 
feasibility of designing a CAD system for London. The fact that demand for ambulance 
services in London is demonstrably greater in scale than elsewhere in the UK caused many 
staff to believe „that systems that might be adequate for other services would not be adequate 
for the LAS‟ (Page et al, 1993, pg. 20). The range of perspectives is reflected in the following 
comments: 
 
there hasn't been a computer system built that could deal with our demand 
 
there isn't one out there you can buy and I don't believe there's one that you can design that will 
be able to do it for us 
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well, all right, maybe, maybe it could, but I'm going to reserve judgement 
 
and then there were those who were „more used to computers and more trusting that something 
would happen that was good for us‟ (LAS, 1998b). 
 
In late 1992, staff in the control room were torn between a desire to „get back to the way that we 
were [in other words, to manual operations]‟, and a recognition that this „was by no means ideal‟ 
(LAS, 1998b). Reverting to full manual operations was seen as problematic because conveyor 
belts, used to transport call details from call takers to ambulance allocators (who assign vehicles 
to emergency calls), had been removed when LASCAD was implemented. So, in recognition of 
the overarching need to improve response times, control room staff made a short-lived attempt to 
continue using the call taking subsystem within LASCAD (LAS, 2000): 
 
… that's the one bit of it that no one really wanted to let go of, because that was actually 
quite good, apart from the difficulties there were about the calls printing out .... we did try 
for a little while .... but there were too many risks involved in it, so we went completely back 
to handwriting calls, having to ferry them about the room because we weren't set up in a way 
that you could get them to [the allocators], we actually had to employ people to run the calls. 
(LAS, 1998b) 
 
The decision to retain the call taking subsystem of LASCAD when the rest of the system was 
withdrawn, may be seen as the use by LAS management of an interessement device that proved 
unsuccessful. Had this subsystem proved more robust, it might have served to lock call takers 
into place in a new network (Callon, 1986) and thereby have facilitated enrolment of control 
room staff to a full CAD development. Instead a printing error was sufficient to break the fragile 
link joining this interest group into the network being built. When this attempt to move forward 
slowly was abandoned, the predominant identity of LAS staff became one of a desire to return to 
the state that existed in 1990, prior to the arrival of John Wilby as chief executive. This identity, 
whilst acknowledging the need to improve performance, was characterized by an attempt to 
achieve this using prevailing manual methods for the foreseeable future, supported by an 
increased number of staff. Thus the period to June 1994 was one of attempting to create a 
workable control room structure to support manual operations in an environment that was 
becoming increasingly unsuitable, not only because essential equipment had been removed, but 
also because noise and overcrowding intensified as staff numbers increased and call volumes 
rose. The futility of this approach, given the increasing pressures on the LAS, was brought 
sharply home to staff with the death of Nasima Begum, which forced a rejection of accepted 
methods of working and crystallized the need for change: 
 
.... and just when we thought we were getting on top of things, we discovered we were not 
really; there are some pretty awful things possible that could go wrong, and did go wrong. 
(LAS, 1998b) 
 
Here, the impact of the „London effect‟, the belief that „we're different, we're special‟ (LAS, 
2000), is crucial. Comments in the earlier part of this section demonstrate both the rhetoric 
that LAS staff used to describe the „London effect‟ and the ways in which they were unable 
to enact it, using either a completely manual system or an implementation, however selective, 
of LASCAD. This suggests that the task for LAS management of enrolling staff support for a 
new computer system required an approach that preserved the rhetoric whilst providing an 
alternative method of enactment. 
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The responses of the external lobby 
 
External bodies, including Government committees, community health councils, other 
ambulance services, the public and the media, were characterized by a range of identities 
reflecting perspectives critical of the LAS. These actors subscribed to the view that the LAS 
was not moving quickly enough to implement the recommendations in the Page report. 
Indeed, some were very sceptical that the LAS in its then current form was capable of 
implementing them (minutes of evidence to House of Commons Select Committee on Health, 
1995). The external lobby voiced criticism in several ways, from drawing on public outrage 
following the death of Nasima Begum to call for better performance by the LAS, to 
suggesting that the service be broken up and amalgamated with other authorities (LAS, 
1998a). 
 
A further problematization 
 
Wells‟ response to the conflicting interests examined in this section was to conclude that „trust 
status would be a desirable objective for the London Ambulance Service‟ because it would 
„strengthen and clarify the chain of management responsibility‟ to ensure that „necessary 
improvements are implemented‟ and a „high standard of service to the public‟ is provided (report 
foreword). This recommendation, proposed to take effect from April 1996, built on the rejection 
of existing methods of working following the death of Nasima Begum and facilitated the 
enrolment of conflicting groups within the service. Supporting recommendations strengthened 
and extended those in the Page inquiry report, including the need to develop a CAD system and 
to have a national review of ORCON standards. By focusing attention in the LAS on restoring 
public confidence, Wells neutralized criticism from external bodies and defined an OPP in trust 
status as the way to improving the performance of the LAS. 
 
Wells used several sources of power to define both the OPP and the actors required traversing it. 
He used public outrage following the death of Nasima Begum to force LAS management and 
staff to speed up the pace of change and to persuade the Government to make sufficient funds 
available to enable this process. By couching his recommendations in terms of trust status, which 
few would argue was a desirable objective for the LAS, however unattainable they thought it 
might be, he was able to create the impression of unity of purpose in pursuit of a common 
beneficial goal. Finally, by publishing his findings in January, five months before the Select 
Committee, Wells was able to set the scene for change on a decisive but largely positive note, 
whilst indicating weaknesses in the LAS that the Select Committee would criticize. 
 
In creating an OPP in trust status, Wells not only identified a crucial objective for the LAS, but, 
in the context of an established internal market within the UK NHS, arguably the only possible 
objective, if the LAS was to continue as an organizational entity in its own right. Thus Wells 
presented a problematization that was difficult to contradict, to the extent that the Select 
Committee also endorsed a trust status objective for the LAS, although they were concerned 
about whether this could be achieved by April 1996. Thus Wells, in his joint role as chairman of 
the public inquiry and chairman of the regional health authority, defined the problem in terms of 
a solution he appeared able to provide, and in this way he became, in Callon‟s (1986) terms, 
indispensable. 
 
Translating the actors 
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In recommending that the LAS seek trust status, Wells linked the interests of the regional health 
authority to the identities he proposed for members of the LAS senior management team, and 
emphasized service improvements as a necessary condition to implement the proposed solution. 
Thus sustained progress towards implementation of a full CAD system during 1997, with 
implementation of a call taking system in September 1995, was a key part of the identity 
proposed for the IT director. Service improvements through new rostering arrangements, a 
redistribution of staff among ambulance stations and the introduction of standby arrangements 
(whereby crews wait in their ambulances for emergency calls) were a key part of the identities 
for other members of the senior management team. Each of these actors had some room for 
manoeuvre while their identities were stabilized. 
 
Although Wells addressed issues on a number of fronts by defining an OPP in trust status, again 
I focus on technology issues. In that sense, the OPP was concerned with implementing a call 
taking system in September 1995, which would enable the necessary improvements in 
performance against ORCON standards to qualify for trust status in April 1996. In this way, 
although the objective of developing a full CAD system by 1997 was endorsed in the Wells 
report, implementing the full system was not part of the OPP, since the goal was to achieve trust 
status beforehand. Thus the Wells report did not address how, in light of continually rising call 
volumes, satisfactory performance as a trust would be maintained if a full CAD system was not 
installed during 1997. This analysis focuses on how the IT director defined, enrolled and 
mobilized support for technological developments, after negotiating his own identity, or more 
specifically, the definition of the technology he was required to implement. 
 
Negotiating the definition of technology 
 
During 1994 and 1995 the IT director, in collaboration with a few members of the senior 
management team, used the power of an ailing IT infrastructure to slow the pace of change to 
enable him to „have something that I knew I could deliver‟ (LAS, 1998a). It was well-recognized 
among this group that this approach would „be seen as stalling‟ (LAS, 1994b), yet Wells built on 
and formalized this approach, and then the Select Committee, in contrast to its comments on 
other management initiatives, reinforced this course of action. The IT director‟s strategy of 
portraying the LAS as „an organization working hard to succeed and making significant 
progress‟ (LAS, 1998a) proved successful again on the issue of procurement of a new computer 
system. This time the Select Committee urged him to consider purchasing a packaged CAD 
system but did not insist, despite the successful experiences of other services and their insistence 
on many other things. So the IT director pursued an in-house development approach. Thus he 
employed existing infrastructural weaknesses as an interessement device to divert attention away 
from a full packaged CAD system towards a system with reduced scope (call taking only) built 
in-house on a sound IT infrastructure. In this way he negotiated his identity, whilst setting the 
scene for development of the CTAK system in which he became a key actor. 
 
The Golden Circle 
 
We turn now to how the IT director locked LAS staff into the network of interests around the 
CTAK system. Here the Golden Circle approach was employed. This approach involved 
managing change by partitioning activities, so as to isolate areas directly involved in a 
change from other influences both within and outside the LAS (LAS, 1994b, 1994c). The 
argument was that people outside the Circle were not affected by the change, hence should 
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not interfere with it. The Circle was drawn around the 300 staff in the control room, who 
were defined as those with a legitimate interest in development of a call taking system. 
People outside the Golden Circle, including LAS ambulance crews, were not aware of the 
implementation date for the new system (LAS, 1998a). This approach identified the actors to 
be involved in the development and sought to disassociate them from those who might 
challenge the legitimacy of the project. It built on existing support within the control room for a 
call taking system and sought to persuade this group that such a system could be implemented 
successfully. Using rhetoric relating to how the LAS had failed before with both a bespoke 
development and a packaged solution, the IT director was able to introduce prototyping 
techniques (LAS, 1998a), which gave control room staff an identity, as an actively involved user 
group, within the development process. The IT director claimed that this approach was one that 
the LAS had not tried, and equally importantly, had not failed with, before. In calling what was 
happening the involvement of a user group, he had grounds for this claim, although prototyping 
was no more than a tactic employed in an overall bespoke development strategy. 
 
Members of the user group were not aware of either the Golden Circle terminology or the related 
policy of partitioning until implementation of the call taking system in 1996 (LAS, 1998b, 2000). 
Yet the approach was laid out in the technology strategy written in late 1994 (LAS, 1994b). So 
control room staff were seduced into an alliance, the rules of engagement in which became 
apparent to them only over time. Nevertheless, these members of staff were aware that 
something was taking place in a shared space that was substantially different from the opposing 
regimes that characterized the LASCAD development; as when changes to the prototype were 
required: 
 
We’d sit in our little huddles in the corner [outside the shared space] saying “what do you think 
we should do, … what shall we say, and … how will we handle this?”, never quite sure what sort 
of reception you were gonna get. And we’d come away from those meetings [in the shared 
space] sometimes and say “hey … we really can say what it is that we want – we can tell them 
we’re gonna have to have it, and then we get it – this is good” (LAS, 1998b) 
 
Responding to my comment that the Golden Circle excluded significant others, and 
especially the vehicle crews [a number of whom allegedly sabotaged the LASCAD 
implementation (minutes of evidence to House of Commons Select Committee on Health, 
1995)], the IT director described the Golden Circle as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. The IT director‟s description of the Golden Circle. 
It was, rather, a means of defence on one part and a means of captivating and 
motivating the important and affected players on the other part. It was never 
intended to disempower but rather empower those who felt so hopelessly ignored in 
the CAD crash of before. It was about doing justice to those who paid a heavy price 
during the CAD collapse and ensuring their views were dominant on the grounds 
that others would be unaffected. It was about team spirit, togetherness, and a sense 
of identity. It was often almost palpably tangible but sometimes gossamer like. It was 
real, it was false, it was for use, it served no purpose, it hindered, it facilitated, it 
empowered, it excluded, it included, it marginalised, it promoted strength, it 
promoted willpower, but most of all, it worked!!!!! [exclamation marks in the 
original] (LAS, 1999) 
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During enrolment, the IT director adopted an „infiltration‟ approach with users (LAS, 1998a). 
Key individuals were identified who liaised between the technology department and the control 
room. These individuals were trusted by „staff side‟ to protect its interests, whilst being 
considered supportive of the proposed changes by „management side‟. Deals made with both 
sides by these individuals were instrumental in enrolling and mobilizing support for 
technological change. The IT director described one such member of staff as: 
 
a great lump of glue that brought all the interests together, because at that time [second half 
1995] some people thought that they could talk to us and some people thought they couldn't, but 
they all thought they could talk to [member of staff]. 
 
The staff member, who described the role as cementing relationships, commented: 
 
we made a pact with one another … in trying to get the trust of the people in Control that we 
would not let anything happen that would be detrimental, so there were a lot of instances where 
we had to say "stop" ... we had to be sure that things that were allowed to go wrong last time 
couldn't go wrong this time ... we had to do a lot of work on helping people to believe that we 
wouldn't let us go down that route again, never again. 
 
Within the Golden Circle, four different solutions were evaluated, prototypes of two of these 
were demonstrated to the user group, and then one was developed and built in joint consultation 
(LAS, 1998a). As the project progressed, different user requirements were addressed by inviting 
contributions from representatives of these interests (LAS, 1998b, 2000). These representatives 
spoke on behalf of the 300 staff in the control room and negotiated the final solution so that, 
ultimately, resources could be mobilized in readiness for implementation. Staff who were 
enthusiastic about computerization were seconded to the user group, and: 
 
we made sure we threw in some sceptics as well, because if you could convince them, then that 
would do a lot of convincing of other people ... we could use them to spread the right sort of 
word ... they'd hear this person talking about such and such ... people would say "blimey, if he's 
saying it's all right, it must be OK ... because you can never please him”. (LAS, 1998b). 
 
The Golden Circle approach and accompanying prototyping techniques resulted in an aligned 
network of interests around a call taking system called CTAK. Actors were translated towards 
this OPP through the use of power exercised in discourse. In this way, the approach illustrates 
the different aspects of the moments of translation: definition of actors; use of interessement 
devices, in the form of a partitioning rationale and prototype demonstrations to the user group, 
which locked actors into identities proposed for them and impeded other alliances; a negotiated 
process of enrolment in which deals, pacts and trials of strength accompanied the interessements 
and made them appear attractive; and designation of legitimate representatives for various 
interest groups during mobilization. In stabilizing the identities of control room staff, two 
considerations were crucial – their fear of failure, and their conflicting need to enhance self-
esteem. In the first case, staff used the powerful image of a computer disaster on New Year‟s Eve 
to delay implementation of the new system from December 1995 to January 1996: 
 
put yourself in the place of those people working on a strange system with the call rate rising as 
it does through December and reaching its peak on New Year's Eve ... why would we want to do 
this to them? (LAS, 1998b). 
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In the second case, despite their view that „we're different, we're special‟ (LAS, 2000), staff were 
conscious of how far behind other services the performance of the LAS had fallen: 
 
… people were not out to sabotage trying to make it work … people wanted to be not looked 
down upon … not just by the public at large and the press particularly, but by other ambulance 
services.  When we were at that stage [implementation], other ambulance services were moving 
on to their second computer system ... and there's us still fumbling around with pens and paper 
… we didn't want to be the ones who are bad at doing things or so behind at doing things, so 
there was a lot of self-respect in there as well. (LAS, 1998b). 
 
Whatever the rhetoric about the „London effect‟, it seems clear that part of the identity of control 
room staff was that traversing the OPP would not only improve the performance of the LAS, but 
would also restore their sense of achievement and with it their self-esteem. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
The above analysis of technological change emphasizes the use of power exercised in 
discourse to achieve translation. In this way, the IT director is seen to use persuasive rhetoric, 
concerning weaknesses in infrastructure and approaches to systems development, to enrol 
support from LAS staff, the Select Committee, and other external bodies, and to lock these 
potential allies into place. He translates the Select Committee‟s contention, that he purchase a 
packaged CAD system, into a bespoke development of a call taking system, and does so 
while the LAS is under considerable pressure to improve its performance in line with other 
services, many of which are using packaged CAD systems. Moreover, he persuades the user 
group of the merits of a bespoke development strategy, although this is a strategy that the 
LAS has tried and been unsuccessful with before, even if the introduction this time of 
prototyping techniques is a new tactic. In this analysis, then, the IT director emerges as a 
powerful actor who, despite sometimes protracted negotiations with others, manages to align 
them with his preferred strategy for information systems development. 
 
Nevertheless, a relational concept of power informs the analysis. Action within the Golden 
Circle is seen as a negotiated process of systems development involving deals, pacts and 
trials of strength, which encourages more user input than had been the case during the 
LASCAD development. So, although some user requirements are challenged by IT staff, and 
other requests are keenly contested within the Circle, the sense of a joint if not unproblematic 
venture, rather than the pitched battle of the LASCAD project, prevails in the argument. 
Furthermore, members of the user group are seen to use persuasive rhetoric, both with their 
colleagues, to enrol the support of those sceptical about the project, and in their dealings with 
IT staff, to negotiate requirements and to delay implementation of the system until January 
1996. 
 
This analysis draws attention to the partitioning aspect of the Golden Circle, and to its covert 
nature during the early days of the CTAK project. Yet, the overall sense in the account is 
that, while power relations within the Golden Circle were asymmetrical, they were not 
essentially repressive (Foucault, 1980b). In making this claim, I need to address some key 
issues. Why was covert action thought necessary? How covert was such action, when 
uniform tells you so much about the wearer‟s role at the LAS? In this way, even without 
being aware of the contents of the technology strategy, was it not possible for members of the 
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Golden Circle to establish by looking around at meetings which broad functions were 
represented? If members of the user group felt that others should be involved, did they not 
have a capacity to act, as when they argued that implementation of the CTAK system should 
be delayed until January 1996? Did those who were excluded have a capacity to intervene, if 
they felt a need to do so? 
 
By way of addressing these issues I argue that, whether they called it the involvement of a 
user group or a means of managing change by partitioning activities, members of the Golden 
Circle were aware that the shared space was “made up” – that it was fabricated. Furthermore, 
whether they acknowledged it explicitly or implicitly, everyone knew who was included and 
who was not. In this way, all subscribed in some manner to the view that vehicle crews, and 
the various external bodies mentioned earlier, did not need to be involved directly in 
development of a call taking system to be used in the LAS control room. Nevertheless, 
members of the Circle were aware that the exclusion was not total, nor in some cases did they 
desire it so. In the day to day running of the LAS, staff in the control room must work with 
the vehicle crews, and therefore they considered the requirements of this relationship when 
developing the CTAK system. Moreover, they knew that the Select Committee and 
government ministers could have intervened in LAS affairs, if they felt that its approach to 
information systems implementation was not an appropriate way to spend public funds. 
Equally, inclusion in the Circle was not unproblematic. The approach encouraged more user 
input than had been the case previously at the LAS, nevertheless systems development efforts 
within the Circle were fragile events that needed constant attention to maintain the stability 
of the group. 
 
In this way, the Golden Circle did not endow its creator, the IT director, with control, nor did 
it deprive the user group of autonomy. The IT director was, at times, overtaken by what he 
had created. When he says that the development process „was very time consuming and 
wearing, to say the least‟ (Computer Bulletin, 1997, p. 23), he shows some of the surprise he 
felt. He did not expect a system that, in its initial implementation, comprised three data 
capture screens (one for each type of call), with related enquiry and printing facilities, to take 
nearly nine months to develop, but „[w]e had to move at a pace that everyone could cope 
with, no matter what their ability … [which] meant explaining over and over what we were 
doing‟ (ibid). Members of the user group were also surprised by the extent of their autonomy, 
as in their comment that „we really can say what it is that we want – we can tell them we‟re 
gonna have to have it, and then we get it – this is good‟ (in the analysis section of this paper). 
 
The Golden Circle emerges as something that made action possible, despite certain fears 
experienced by its members: fear, for example, that sabotage might occur again, as alleged 
about the LASCAD implementation (minutes of evidence to House of Commons Select 
Committee on Health, 1995); fear, also, of another disaster, with all the media attention and 
public scrutiny that followed in the wake of LASCAD. Indeed, for many, a fear of 
experiencing fear again, the fear that gripped staff in the control room as they lost their sense 
of organization or structure when trying to use the LASCAD system (LAS, 2000-2001b). 
 
Now, a paragraph I included in my analysis of the CTAK project starts to come alive. It is the 
IT director‟s response to reading an early draft of this paper, in which he felt I developed a 
rather limited view of the Golden Circle. In this rendering, we learn of the history of the 
Golden Circle, and get a sense of what it means to say that it was both exclusive and 
inclusive, both mysterious and rational, both constructed and real. I refer the reader to the IT 
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director‟s words, in Figure 1, now that I have tried to give a greater sense of how I have come 
to understand them. 
 
In this discussion, then, the Golden Circle emerges as a way of arguing and acting that made 
argument and action possible. Latour‟s (1999b) word for such an idea is a factish, although he 
seems resistant to the notion that social scientists can arrive at such a position from a 
Foucauldian informed discourse about power/knowledge relations. Nevertheless, with a little bit 
of prompting from Pandora’s Hope, I seem to have managed that translation. 
 
Factishes, making-do and translation drift 
 
Factish is a neologism coined by Latour (1999b) to indicate a combination of fact and fetish. 
It is a type of action that does not force us to choose between real knowledge (facts) and 
powerful beliefs (fetishes), but rather to focus on ways of arguing and acting that are always 
fabricated. Such a view takes the position that there are neither amoral manipulators who take 
in naïve believers, nor apolitical moralists who argue for participation by all. Equally though, 
Latour would resist saying that there is a combination of the moralist and the politician in all 
of us, if this were to suggest that these elements can be retrieved independently, rather than 
being entangled, inseparable and shaped with same clay. The concept of a factish, then, is 
one example of Latour‟s (1999a) efforts to develop a vocabulary for actor-network theory 
that eschews distinctions such as power and knowledge, or politics and morality, that come to 
us ex ante loaded with meaning. 
 
A factish is constructed, it is what holds people together, but this attachment does not 
decrease autonomy; rather it fosters it. In this way, we are always a little surprised, or 
overtaken, by what we do. That which acts through us is also surprised by what we do, „by 
the chance to mutate, to change, and to bifurcate, the chance that I and the circumstances 
surrounding me offer to that which has been invited, recovered, welcomed‟ (Latour, 1999b, 
p. 281). A factish „protects humans against inhumanity … [it is] the thing that, when 
removed, turns them into monsters, animals, things‟ (p. 286). 
 
When the Golden Circle is conceived as a factish, the rules of engagement in it are neither 
wholly mysterious nor entirely rational. Rather they are worked out as the project progresses, 
in a „making-do, accomplished along with others in an event, with the specific opportunities 
provided by the circumstances‟ (Latour, 1999b, p. 288). The need for constant attention, with 
unforeseen consequences, to a fragile moral order and an unstable social one (ibid.) is 
emphasized. Action within the Golden Circle involves an ability to grasp opportunities 
provided in the moment. After translation, Latour (1999b) argues, a drift or slippage in the 
actors‟ original goals will be observed, in which they are surprised by what they have 
created. 
 
A reading of the CTAK project in terms of making-do and translation drift suggests that, 
following the death of Nasima Begum, and arguably even before, the IT director was trying 
to find a way of arguing and acting that would make implementation of an information 
system possible at the LAS. He realized that „[u]sers‟ confidence was rock bottom, so [he] 
decided to start with some relatively safe but important [infrastructure] projects‟ (Computer 
Bulletin, 1997, p.23). In this environment, his realization that infrastructure projects were 
„relatively safe‟ was arguably far more telling that his view that they are „important‟. Fear 
seems more significant in this move than the implementation of sound management practice. 
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Similarly, the death itself may be seen as giving rise to a number of makings-do, that grasped 
the circumstances of the moment, in which previously accepted methods of working were 
rejected. In this way, the IT director‟s discourse with the user group about information 
systems development strategies and techniques, whether in the vocabulary of prototyping or 
“something the LAS has not used before”, may be seen as one that helped to allay their 
mutual fears about sabotage and failure. Indeed, the CTAK system addressed a need – to 
provide more efficient and effective support for call taking – that was accepted at the LAS as 
far back as 1992. Thus the challenge for the IT director following the withdrawal of 
LASCAD was to find an approach to technology deployment that built on this need without 
jeopardizing the initiative by, at the same time, introducing some of the more controversial 
elements of a CAD system. 
 
While much of the attention in this discussion has focused on discourses in which the IT 
director of the LAS was a key actor, similar concepts may be used to describe discourses in a 
broader community. In the context of the UK NHS, William Wells may be seen as someone 
who found a way of arguing and acting that made organizational change at the LAS possible. 
Following the death of Nasima Begum in June 1994, he argued that the service should aim to 
achieve NHS trust status. While undoubtedly some observers felt that the LAS could not 
achieve this objective, in the context of an established internal market within the UK NHS, 
there was an absence of voices raised in contradiction to Wells‟ proposal. In his joint role as 
chairman of the public inquiry into the death of Nasima Begum and as chairman of the 
regional health authority, Wells was able to support his proposal with additional Government 
funding worth £15 million. In this way, he grasped opportunities provided by the changing 
environment of the UK NHS, at a time when members of the LAS found their existing factish 
– of improved performance using manual methods of working – to be wanting. 
 
Postscript 
 
In the years that have elapsed since the LAS achieved trust status, its organizational change 
programme has continued alongside the need to respond to ever more demanding standards 
of performance. The basis on which ambulance services respond to emergency calls has 
altered. Now, services must prioritize the emergency calls they receive and respond to 
patients based on a clinical assessment of their need (Chapman, 1996). Performance targets 
for the number of responses to be achieved in 8 minutes and 14 minutes have also changed. A 
call prioritization system has been implemented at the LAS to support these arrangements 
(LAS, 2000-2001a). Limitations of the original CTAK system have been recognized and a 
number of enhancements to it have been made. Preparations for the millennium celebrations 
required significant effort, particularly since New Year‟s Eve is always the busiest night of 
the year at the LAS. 
 
In all of this, implementation of the remaining four elements of a CAD system moved 
backstage (LAS, 2000). As of the end of 2001, a computerized mapping system provides a 
way of locating the position of ambulances, but no automated support is available for linking 
ambulances with the calls they are attending. In this way, the processes of allocating and 
mobilizing resources to incidents, managing ambulance resources, and the associated 
provision of management information, are still largely manual operations. The factishes, and 
hence the ways of making-do, have changed or metamorphosed. The complex interactions 
that account for this drift tell another story in the history of the LAS, one in which power 
relations and identity, fear and making-do, or however else we choose to argue, mixes up the 
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politics and morality of technological change, again, in a very messy way. So we may 
conclude that while factishes provide us with ways of arguing and acting, they require 
constant attention to do so. Goals are interrupted, detours are taken, and shifts in meaning 
occur. Organizational change is precarious and unpredictable. Key actors can grasp specific 
opportunities, and accomplish things with others in an event, but since the event changes all 
of them, grasping further opportunities requires a subtle programme of action that is sensitive 
to a constantly changing collective (Latour, 1999b). 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
This paper is an account of events at the LAS over a four-year period, as it recovered from 
the collapse of LASCAD through a process of long-term, and ongoing, organizational 
change. This research draws on actor-network theory to focus on the implementation of a 
new computer system in 1996. The analysis is informed by the sociology of translation 
(Callon, 1986), and then arguments from that account are discussed in terms of concepts from 
Latour‟s (1999b) recent work. The analysis emphasizes the way various stratagems employed 
by key actors, including the use of persuasive rhetoric, helped to create and maintain network 
allegiances. The discussion interprets the political dimension of these actions, as an 
opportunistic effort to address a fear of information systems implementation within the 
organization. In this context, such fear existed following the implementation of the LASCAD 
system, in which it is alleged that 20 people died in 36 hours following protracted waits for 
an ambulance (Guardian, 1992; Independent, 1992, but see also Page et al, 1993 for a counter 
to these allegations). When the case is examined in terms of the concept of a factish, and a 
vocabulary of making-do (Latour, 1999b), the improvised and unanticipated nature of the 
change efforts is emphasized. Key actors are seen to grasp opportunities presented in the 
moment to engage support for information systems implementation at the LAS. The themes 
of fear and improvisation in organizations emerge from the analysis rather than being buried 
in the argument. These findings have implications for research and practice. 
 
Implications for practice 
 
Drawing on the Foucauldian arguments that inform the sociology of translation, the Golden 
Circle may be seen as a regime of truth (Foucault, 1980b), that is, as the way a given 
community makes the discourses it accepts function as true. In this view of activity, members 
of the community draw on knowledge that is both institutionally framed and locally 
informed, and enact it in a negotiated process in which some members obtain the right to 
speak for all. In the case of the LAS, various members of the Golden Circle drew on 
knowledge of best practice for information systems development and management, and on 
standards of good performance for ambulance services, and enacted this knowledge in a way 
that was sensitive to local conditions. In particular, they were sensitive to the history of 
information systems implementation at the LAS, and to issues of managing ambulance 
service operations in London. In this way, the Golden Circle provided a framework or model 
for information systems development and management, in which certain modes of arguing 
were accepted by its members, and were enacted by them in a way that addressed a dominant 
mood within the community. Following the collapse of LASCAD, the dominant mood was 
fear, in particular fear of failure and fear of sabotage. 
 
Drawing on Latour‟s (1999b) arguments about the nature of a factish, the Golden Circle was 
a way of arguing and acting that made implementation and use of an information system 
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possible. It protected its members, as well as making it possible for them to accomplish 
things together. Here, I emphasize how mood, as an attunement with the situation and a 
medium within which activities take place (Ciborra, 2001) influenced the way that actors 
performed. Key actors within the user group approached this period of information systems 
development in an anxious mood, fuelled by their experiences during the LASCAD project. 
The IT director was anxious too, given the stakes involved, but he sought to combat this 
mood, to drive it away (Ciborra, 2001, citing Heidegger, 1995), by grasping opportunities as 
they arose, and by presenting what he was doing in a persuasive way to internal and external 
audiences. 
 
In the mood in which they approached systems development, members of the Golden Circle 
sought to provide automated support for a limited number of control room activities, which in 
turn limited the number of people who were thought to be directly involved. The rules of 
engagement in the Golden Circle were negotiated as the project progressed, as it became 
clearer who needed to be involved and who did not. In seeking to prevent interference by 
those who were not seen as directly involved, the Golden Circle became a protection against 
fear, but by attending to their structure, members of the Circle found that their capacity to act 
increased (Weick, 1993). In this way, systems development activity within the Golden Circle 
was action in which there was time available, there were resources at hand, and there was a 
solution to the problem that had to be addressed. In other words, members of the Circle acted 
in a way that seems to be influenced by most of the attributes that fear does not have – they 
improvised. The CTAK system emerges from the process as something built by the group in 
interaction, rather than being, in a more traditional view of information systems development, 
the product of a structured sequence of activities, such as feasibility, requirements analysis, 
system design and development, implementation. 
 
Writers on improvisation argue that what takes place becomes „visible only after the fact‟ 
(Weick, 1993, p. 348), so that action that „looks extemporaneous … [then] turns out to be 
highly competent behaviour‟ (Ciborra, 1999, p 136-7). In this way, it may be argued that 
what took place within the Golden Circle was broadly in line with a prototyping approach to 
information systems development – an approach considered by many to be a highly 
competent way to manage the development process. However, the IT director (Computer 
Bulletin, p. 23) presents what occurred as the implementation of a decision taken ex ante 
(„we chose prototyping‟), whereas the argument of the last section is that such a 
rationalization only became possible post facto. The latter argument explains why members 
of the user group felt uncertain about how to handle requests for changes to the prototype, 
and concerned about how these requests would be received by IT staff, while at the same 
time they felt able to make such requests. If a decision to adopt prototyping had been agreed 
in advance, it seems unlikely that key members of the user group would have experienced the 
combination of uncertainty and empowerment that took place within the Golden Circle. 
Rather the degrees of both experiences would probably have been reduced, since a greater 
degree of certainty about how to act during prototyping might have suggested that a greater 
licence to act should be taken for granted. 
 
This research, then, suggests that frameworks or models for information systems 
development and management should address emotional as well as cognitive aspects, and 
also the interrelationship between these two dimensions. In this way, they need to attend to 
the moods in which actors approach the task of systems development. Furthermore, they 
should address the way that, in responding to a mood, actors may engage in various degrees 
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of improvised activity. Finally, they should not underestimate the attention that is needed to 
modes of arguing and acting to create and maintain the stability of a group involved in a 
systems development effort. Existing frameworks, whether based on a lifecycle or an 
evolutionary model, and whether informed by an engineering approach or a socio-technical 
one, neglect or underplay one or more of these considerations. Further research might explore 
the relationship between moods, modes of arguing and acting, and models for information 
systems development and management in different settings. Such research might draw on the 
existing body of literature in organizational theory on emotion in the workplace, for example 
Fineman‟s (2000) edited volume, which provides an overview of the main areas of concern 
and a collection of papers exploring key themes. These ideas would complement existing 
perspectives in information systems research which, in general, view systems development as 
a cognitive process, and more specifically, fail to exploit the works of Foucault for 
emotionality. 
 
Implications for teaching and research 
 
The information systems development activity described in this case, in particular the actions 
of the IT director during the CTAK project, may be seen as a very effective improvised 
performance. While such an account of making-do is considered highly reputable in certain 
branches of research, the normative literature read by managers shows less tolerance for a 
rendering of improvised responses to specific circumstances. Rather, much of that literature, 
and trade journals in particular, seek to explain what takes place in terms of adherence to best 
practice, underplaying the ad hoc element of action, as in an account of the CTAK project 
published in Computer Bulletin (1997). That account is „based partly on recent presentations 
by [the IT director of the LAS] to the BCS [British Computer Society] London Medical and 
Project Management specialist groups‟ (p. 24), and the words of the IT director are cited 
throughout. Paradoxically, then, even when practitioners give a very competent improvised 
performance, they are unlikely to acknowledge it as such. 
 
The notion of improvisation in organizations has implications for how we teach, how we do 
research, and how we write about what we do. Many managers are educated via professional 
courses to understand their actions in terms of normative discourses, so it is hardly surprising 
that they present rationalistic accounts of their achievements, even when their experience 
suggests otherwise. It was only when I challenged the IT director – when I influenced his 
mood – by presenting what he considered to be a limited view of the Golden Circle, that I 
prompted him to give the much richer description of it discussed earlier. This suggests a need 
to give more attention to the improvisation literature in management education. While 
improvisation, never mind the moods to which it might be a response, remains largely a 
concept that people in organizations use to describe jazz or theatre, but not their own work, 
we may be neglecting a way of arguing and acting that could enrich both research and 
practice. Furthermore, if all activity involves some degree of improvisation (Weick, 1998), 
then writing is an improvised performance. With this argument in mind, academic journal 
editors and reviewers might act so as to create possibilities for a greater number of papers 
that adopt a tentative and open-ended style – a style that seems to characterize improvised 
activity, and with which I bring this paper to a close. 
 
Thus, I do not claim that an account of the CTAK project in terms of factishes and making-do 
(Latour, 1999b) either overcomes or bypasses an account informed by a sociology of 
translation (Callon, 1986) and a power/knowledge relationship (Foucault, 1980a). Rather, 
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these accounts seem to complement one another. In this way, I have translated the ideas of 
two major proponents of actor-network theory to arrive at fear and improvisation – or moods, 
modes of arguing and acting, and a tentative model for information systems development and 
management – which may be a different place altogether. Latour‟s (1999b) nonmodern way 
of arguing invited me to improvise, so I took the opportunity „to mutate, to change, and to 
bifurcate‟ (p. 281) as well as I am able to do, with what I had to hand, and in the mood in 
which Pandora’s Hope left me. It is for readers to decide how effective I have been. 
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